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  1 
Finance-Growth Nexus in Sudan: Empirical  
Assessment Based on an Application of  
the Autoregressive Distributed  
Lag (ARDL) Model 
 




  This study investigates the effect of financial development on economic 
performance in Sudan over the period (1970- 2004). The short-run and long-run 
relationship between financial development and economic growth and other 
conditioning variables on economic growth are estimated by using the most recently 
developed autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach to co- integration analysis 
proposed by Pesaran and Shin (1999).The results overwhelmingly indicate a weak 
relationship between financial development and economic growth in Sudan. Although 
the coefficient of M3/GDP is significant, it is negative, whilst the impact of credit to 
private sector by banks to real GDP is negative and insignificant. These findings may be 
attributed to the inefficient allocation of resources by banks, along with the absence of 
an appropriate investment climate required to foster significant private investment and 
promote growth in the long run, and to the poor quality of credit disbursal of the banking 
sector in Sudan. Moreover, the econometric analysis suggest that the speed of 
adjustment in the estimated models is relatively high and had the expected significant 
and negative sign. 
  
 
ﻥﺍﺩﻮﺴﻟﺍ ﰲ ﻱﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻﺍ ﻮﻤﻨﻟﺎﺑ ﱄﺎﳌﺍ ﺭﻮﻄﺘﻟﺍ ﺔﻗﻼﻋ ﻥﺍﺩﻮﺴﻟﺍ ﰲ ﻱﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻﺍ ﻮﻤﻨﻟﺎﺑ ﱄﺎﳌﺍ ﺭﻮﻄﺘﻟﺍ ﺔﻗﻼﻋ ﻥﺍﺩﻮﺴﻟﺍ ﰲ ﻱﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻﺍ ﻮﻤﻨﻟﺎﺑ ﱄﺎﳌﺍ ﺭﻮﻄﺘﻟﺍ ﺔﻗﻼﻋ ﻥﺍﺩﻮﺴﻟﺍ ﰲ ﻱﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻﺍ ﻮﻤﻨﻟﺎﺑ ﱄﺎﳌﺍ ﺭﻮﻄﺘﻟﺍ ﺔﻗﻼﻋ  :  :  :  :  ﺝﺫﻮﳕ ﻡﺍﺪﺨﺘﺳﺍ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺔﻴﻨﺒﻣ ﺔﻴﻘﻴﺒﻄﺗ ﺔﺳﺍﺭﺩ  ﺝﺫﻮﳕ ﻡﺍﺪﺨﺘﺳﺍ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺔﻴﻨﺒﻣ ﺔﻴﻘﻴﺒﻄﺗ ﺔﺳﺍﺭﺩ  ﺝﺫﻮﳕ ﻡﺍﺪﺨﺘﺳﺍ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺔﻴﻨﺒﻣ ﺔﻴﻘﻴﺒﻄﺗ ﺔﺳﺍﺭﺩ  ﺝﺫﻮﳕ ﻡﺍﺪﺨﺘﺳﺍ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺔﻴﻨﺒﻣ ﺔﻴﻘﻴﺒﻄﺗ ﺔﺳﺍﺭﺩ
ﻉﺯﻮﳌﺍ ﺀﺎﻄﺑﻺﻟ ﻲﺗﺍﺬﻟﺍ ﺭﺍﺪﳓﻻﺍ ﻉﺯﻮﳌﺍ ﺀﺎﻄﺑﻺﻟ ﻲﺗﺍﺬﻟﺍ ﺭﺍﺪﳓﻻﺍ ﻉﺯﻮﳌﺍ ﺀﺎﻄﺑﻺﻟ ﻲﺗﺍﺬﻟﺍ ﺭﺍﺪﳓﻻﺍ ﻉﺯﻮﳌﺍ ﺀﺎﻄﺑﻺﻟ ﻲﺗﺍﺬﻟﺍ ﺭﺍﺪﳓﻻﺍ  
 
ﺺﺨﻠﻣ ﺺﺨﻠﻣ ﺺﺨﻠﻣ ﺺﺨﻠﻣ
 
ةﺮﺘﻔﻠﻟ  نادﻮﺴﻟا ﻲﻓ يدﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻا ﻮﻤﻨﻟا لﺪﻌﻣ ﻰﻠﻋ ﻲﻟﺎﻤﻟا رﻮﻄﺘﻟا ﺮﻴﺛﺄﺗ رﺎﺒﺘﺧا ﻰﻟإ ﺔﺳارﺪﻟا ﻩﺬه فﺪﻬﺗ   1970  
- 2004  .  راﺪ  ﺤﻧﻻا ﺔﻴﺠﻬﻨ  ﻣ ماﺪﺨﺘ  ﺳﺎﺑ و  عزﻮ  ﻤﻟا ﺆﻃﺎﺒ  ﺘﻟا وذ ﻲ  ﺗاﺬﻟا  ) ARDL  (  و كﺮﺘ  ﺸﻤﻟا ﻞﻣﺎﻜﺘ  ﻟا ﻞﻴﻠ  ﺤﺘﻟ
                           ﻦ ﺷ و نارﺎ ﺴﻴﺑ ﻦ ﻣ ﻞ آ ﺔﻄ ﺳاﻮﺑ ﺔﺛﺪﺤﺘ ﺴﻤﻟا ) 1999 (       ﻞآ ﻦﻴﺑ ﻞﺟﻷا ﺔﻠﻳﻮﻃ و ةﺮﻴﺼﻗ ﺔﻗﻼﻌﻟا رﺎﺒﺘﺧا ﻢﺗ  ،
  نادﻮ  ﺴﻟا ﻲ  ﻓ يدﺎ  ﺼﺘﻗﻻ ﻮﻤﻨ  ﻟا و ﻲﻟﺎ  ﻤﻟا رﻮﻄﺘ  ﻟا   تاﺮ  ﺷﺆﻣ ﻦ  ﻣ  .  ﻰﻟإ كﺮﺘ  ﺸﻤﻟا ﻞﻣﺎﻜﺘ  ﻟا رﺎﺒ  ﺘﺧا لد ﺪ  ﻗ و
 ﺔﻔﻴﻌ  ﺿ ﺔ  ﻗﻼﻋ دﻮ  ﺟو نادﻮ  ﺴﻟا ﻲ  ﻓ يدﺎ  ﺼﺘﻗﻻا ﻮﻤﻨ  ﻟا و ﻲﻟﺎ  ﻤﻟا رﻮﻄﺘ  ﻟا ﻦ  ﻴﺑ  .  ﻞﻣﺎ  ﻌﻣ ﺔﻳﻮﻨ  ﻌﻣ ﻦ  ﻣ ﻢﻏﺮﻟﺎﺒ  ﻓ
         دﻮﻘﻨ ﻟا ضﺮ ﻋ   ﻲﻟﺎ ﻤﺟﻹا                ﻰﻠ ﺤﻤﻟا ﺞﺗﺎﻨ ﻟا ﻦ ﻣ ﺔﺒ ﺴﻨآ  ﻹا   ﻟﺎ ﻤﺟ ﻲ            ﺮﻴﺛﺄﺗ نﺎ آ ﺎﻤﻨ ﻴﺑ ،ﺔﺒﻟﺎ ﺳ ﺖﻧﺎ آ ﻪﺗرﺎ ﺷإ نإ ﻻإ 
                يﻮﻨﻌﻣ ﺮﻴﻏ و ﺎﺒﻟﺎﺳ يدﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻا  ﻮﻤﻨﻟا ﻰﻠﻋ ﺔﻳرﺎﺠﺘﻟا كﻮﻨﺒﻟا ﺔﻄﺳاﻮﺑ حﻮﻨ ﻤﻤﻟا نﺎﻤﺘ ﺋﻻا ﺮﻴﻐﺘ ﻣ  .  ﻩﺬه  ﺞﺋﺎﺘﻨﻟا
                             و  ﻢﺋﻼﻤﻟا يرﺎﻤﺜﺘﺳﻻا خﺎﻨﻤﻟا بﺎﻴﻏ و ،كﻮﻨﺒﻟا ﺔﻄﺳاﻮﺑ دراﻮﻤﻠﻟ لﺎ ﻌﻔﻟا ﺮ ﻴﻏ ﺺﻴ ﺼﺨﺘﻟا ﻰﻟإ ﺎﻬﺘﺒ ﺴﻧ ﻦ ﻜﻤﻳ
                        نادﻮﺴﻟا ﻲﻓ كﻮﻨ ﺒﻟا ﺔﻄ ﺳاﻮﺑ حﻮﻨ ﻤﻤﻟا نﺎﻤﺘ ﺋﻻا ﺔ ﻴﻋﻮﻧ ﻰﻟإ   .      نأ ﻲﺳﺎﻴﻘﻟا ﻞﻴﻠﺤﺘﻟا ﺪآأ ﺪﻘﻓ ﻚﻟذ ﻰﻟإ ﺔﻓﺎﺿﻹﺎﺑ
           ﺢ  ﻀﺗأ و ﺎﻴﺒ  ﺴﻧ ﺔ  ﻴﻟﺎﻋ ﺖﻧﺎ  آ ةرﺪ  ﻘﻤﻟا جذﺎﻤﻨ  ﻟا ﻲ  ﻓ ﻞﻳﺪﻌﺘ  ﻟا ﺔﻋﺮ  ﺳ      ﺔﻴﺋﺎ  ﺼﺣﻹا ﺔﻳوﺰ  ﻐﻤﻟا لﻼ  ﺧ ﻦ  ﻣ ﻚ  ﻟذ
و ﻹا رﺎﺷ ة ﺄﻄﺨﻟا ﺢﻴﺤﺼﺗ جذﻮﻤﻧ ﻞﻣﺎﻌﻤﻟ ﺔﺒﻟﺎﺴﻟا   .  
 




              The financial sector usually plays a central role in the process of 
economic development and growth in a country. Banks as financial 
intermediaries play a key role in transforming deposits into financial assets. They 
channel funds from entities with surplus liquidity to those lacking it, thereby 
facilitating capital formation and trade. Banks also play a key role in filtering 
information by screening borrowers and monitoring their activities in financial 
systems characterized by incomplete and asymmetric information. Their 
improved efficiency is therefore quite crucial in ensuring the success of financial 
liberalization (Ephraim & Montfort, 2004). In this context, well-developed 
financial systems can be expected to accelerate the development process by 
channeling financial recourses to the most productive use. The most influential 
works that underpin this hypothesis are perhaps (Levine and King 1993a, 1993b) 
which suggest that better financial systems lead to more robust economic growth. 
 
      However, despite the major role played by the financial sector in the 
process of growth and development, its role remains quite limited in many 
developing countries, especially sub-Saharan African countries. This due to the 
fact that, the financial sector in most countries remains highly fragmented and 
inefficient, protected from competition or is highly segmented and regulated. 
Moreover, financial systems in most SSA countries are dominated by a small 
number of banks that command heavy markets power, which undermines the 
efficiency allocation of resources.  
 
            In the mid 1980s, many countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) initiated 
financial Policy reforms as part of structural adjustment programs. As a result, 
most SSA governments shifted their economies from the state of "control" model 
to more market based systems as a means of promoting a stable economic 
environment. This was particularly relevant in the financial sector where it was 
hoped that streamlining the sector would stimulate domestic resource 
mobilization and increase the capacity of the banking system to support private 
sector participation in economic development. 
 
         As in most developing countries, the Sudanese financial market is still 
young and underdeveloped following years of repression, political and economic 
instability up healed by long chronic civil war. To develop the financial sector 
the government embarked upon policies to reform it. These reforms, which took 
a variety of forms, started long years ago and can be traced back to the years 
following the independence in 1956, but these reforms had shown little 
improvements in the Sudan financial sector because they were not implemented 
under formal structural economic programs. 
 
            As  part  of  its  economic  and  structural  adjustment  program,  the 
government has adopted a comprehensive package of financial policy reforms in 
the  early 1990s.The claimed objective is to  create an improved business 
environment through  relaxing  some of the financial sector restrictions, 
modernize the financial sector to cope with the new  achievements in the banking  3 
industry and to build more efficient financial market to promote economic 
growth through a more efficient allocation of credit.  
 
  This paper is concerned with the short and long run determinants of 
economic growth in the context of Sudan. It uses the bounds testing procedure to 
examine empirically the impact of the financial sector development on economic 
growth in Sudan by employing data for the period 1970-2004.Other objective of 
the present study is , to investigate the impact of the formal financial sector 
reform on economic issues in Sudan. Different economic and financial indicators 
are separately discussed to measure how far Sudan has benefited from the reform 
policy. In this study we are going to question whether financial development, in 
the sense of deregulated environment can be expected to act as “engine of 
growth” in the development process, and we argue in favor of a more cautions 
approach to financial sector reform. 
 
          The paper proceeds as follows: section two, provides a brief review of 
the Sudanese economic development, besides an overview of the Sudanese 
banking system. The section also shows the experience of the financial sector 
reform in Sudan and its impact on economic issues. Section three, briefly 
reviews the extensive literature on the growth- finance nexus. Section four, 
specify the model and indicates the sources of data and setting up the 
econometric methodology used in the study. Section five, contains the main 
findings of the study, their analyses and assessments, and the final section 
contains policy implications and conclusions 
 
2. Economic and Financial Development in Sudan 
     2.1 A Brief Review of the Sudanese Economic Development 
 
       Sudan is the largest country in Africa
(1), with significant human capital 
and vast natural resources base providing enormous development potential. 
Sudan is predominantly agricultural economy. The agricultural sector remains 
the most important sector in the economy; it contributes by 38.7 percent to GDP 
(2003) and employs about 80 percent of the population (1998). Despite of its 
major contributions to the Sudanese economy, the agricultural sector was 
crippled by a series of cumbersome bureaucratic procedures such as import 
licensing, registration of exports, reporting of stocks and restrictions of crop 
movement. These administrative interventions greatly discouraged production 
and exports. Moreover domestic policies were unstable, which was clearly 
manifested in the pricing and marketing of agricultural products .However, the 
declining of the growth rate of exports in last years is closely related to the 
declining share of agriculture in the domestic economies of Sudan and the 
expansion of the non-trade service sector. 
 
      In the late 1970 and like other sub-Saharan African countries. Sudan‘s 
economy began to experience severe interdependent structural problems that 
inhabited economic growth (world bank, 1985). The average performance of the 
economy has worsened over the last two decades. And by the turn of the 1980’s 
                                                  
(1)  Sudan is Africa's largest country (2, 5 million square kilometres) and the ninth largest country 
in the world.  4 
decade economic conditions in Sudan assumed crisis propositions. A steadily 
declining income and consumption per capita, persistence deficit in the balance 
of payment and external debt have characterized this period. These structural 
imbalances had attributed mainly to the failure of the ambitious development 
programmes in the early 1970’s.In that period the government was not in a 
position to raises sufficient   resources to finance the development programmes. 
To fill this gap, the government resorted to both internal and external finance. 
Internally, expansionary monetary policy and deficit financing were used to 
correct the domestic deficit and externally through massive borrowing from 
abroad. However, this situation leads to more deterioration in the performance of 
the Sudanese economy, which manifested by the prevailing balance of payment 
problems and the serious indebtedness. In 1984, Sudan outstanding external debt 
reached US $ 6 billion and is currently estimated at US$ 16.09 billion for 2004. 
The inability to finance the debt has constrained Sudan’s access to international 
financial assistance, which in turn has restricted investment and economic 
growth. 
 
         It is generally agreed however that, the poor performance of Sudan remains 
by and large a legacy of a long history of domestic policy mistakes. However, 
the spreading civil war, government’s economic policies, and mismanagement of 
resources at the macro level have played significant roles in debilitating the 
economic structures, resources and its overall growth throughout the national 
governance regimes since independence, in 1956. 
 
      To address these issues, the government initiated a series of reform efforts 
aimed at arresting economic deterioration. The first reform attempt was in 1978 
when the Sudanese government requested the IMF financial assistance to tackle 
its internal and external imbalances. But the reforms covering this period (1978-
84) were neither well sequenced nor fully implemented. A second wave of 
reforms known as Sudan’s structural adjustment policies (SAP) was initiated 
under the Program of the National comprehensive Plan (1992-2002). However, 
this program of economic reform (namely, SAP) was both successful and 
unusual. It was successful because it restored macrocosmic stability, revived 
economic growth, and resulting in increasing per capita income (World Bank, 
1998). It was unusual in the sense that “as the name implies”, these policies were 
homegrown and were pursued without external financing or technical assistance 
either from the World Bank or the IMF. But, since 1997, the Macroeconomic 
stabilization program has monitored by the IMF. From then, Sudan has seen 
stable progress on basic economic indicators. Growth has been relatively steady, 
despite the civil war. Annual GDP growth rate averaged in excess of 5 per cent 
during the period 1995-2002, reflecting the package’s success and the important 
role of oil, of which the country became a net exporter in 1999.The joint world 
bank/UNDP – led assessment team concluded that the package had yielded 
macroeconomic stability but at a high price in terms of unequal distribution of 
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 2.2. Overview of the Sudanese Banking System 
       2.2.1 Structure of the Sudan’s Banking Sector 
 
             Like  many  developing  countries,  the  Sudanese  financial  sector  was 
dominated by commercial banks’ rather than by bonds and equity markets, which 
require a mature system of accounting and financial information. The financial 
system in the Sudan has undergone significant developments since the 
establishment of the Bank of Sudan on February 22, 1960. Now, Sudan’s 
financial system consists of the central bank of Sudan (CBOS); 25 commercial 
banks, 16 of which are completely or mostly privately owned, and seven state-
owned commercial banks. The sector also includes four specialized state-owned 
banks, two investment banks and a number of non-bank financial intermediaries 
(NBFIs), mainly insurance companies. 
 
         Historically,  Sudan’s  financial  system  has  been  characterized  by  heavy 
government interventions and regulations, centralized lending by the central 
bank to public enterprises, absence of indirect monetary policy instruments, Lax 
bank supervision and an inadequate accounting system.   According to (Kireyev, 
2001), the Sudanese banks still remains very small even by the modest 
international standard as compared with Islamic banks in other countries.   The 
total amount of deposits of the banking system has been hovering around $ 500 
million since mid-1990 and is dominated by demand deposits with a share of 
over 70% whereas saving and investment deposits remain relatively small. 
According to him, this reflects the cash nature of the Sudanese economy where 
individuals prefer to have instant and easy access to their funds.  
   
            It is apparently from the consolidating balance sheet of the central bank 
of Sudan that the commercial banking sector constitutes the major source of 
credit in Sudan. This can be reflected in the size and the amount of deposit 
liabilities deposited in the commercial banks. Due to the fact that deposit 
liabilities of non- banking financial institutions are relatively insignificant, a 
close approximation to the community’s aggregate savings in financial forms can 
be observed by the size of the deposit liabilities of the commercial banks. Table 
(1), shows the growth of the central government and private sector deposits with 
commercial banks for the period (1990-2001). It is relatively apparent from the 
table that private/pubic sector deposits dominate the total deposit liabilities of the 
commercial banks reaching 92.8% of the total in 1990 and 97.4% in 2001.The 
substantial increase in these deposits is attributed firstly to the rise in the 
commercial banks nominal interest rate to 8% (the period of the conventional 
banking system) and the rise in the profit margins of Murabaha (for the Islamic 
banking system) and secondly to the continuous spread of commercial banks 
branches. 
  6 
Table 1: Growth of the Central Government and Private Sector’s  
Deposits with Commercial Banks – (SD 000’s) 
 
Year  Government 
Deposits 
Public Institutions and 
Private Deposits  Total 
1990 122  1582  1704 
1991 172  2817  2989 
1992 236  9209  9445 
1993 639  16095 16734 
1994 806  22630 23436 
1995 315  41327 41642 
1996 767  67026 67793 
1997 400  96354 96754 
1998 424  119689  120113 
1999 3527  141992 145519 
2000 6352  190872 197224 
2001 7076  267112 274188 
 
Source: Bank of Sudan Annual Reports (1990-2001). 
 
  In general, commercial banks lending in Sudan is predominantly short 
term and is heavily concentrated in traditional sectors, such as trade, and 
profitable short-term activities. As table (2) below shows the whole pattern of 
lending has been dominated by the financing of foreign trade. This has been 
especially the case with respect to advances to finance exports which increased 
to 69% in 1990. 
 
Table 2: Commercial bank’s lending by economic sector (SD 000’s) 
 
Year Agriculture  Industry  Exports  Imports  Local 




















































































































































































































*Numbers in brackets shows percentage of sector of finance to total finance 
Source:  Bank of Sudan Annual Reports (1990-2004).  7 
Despite the fact that, the agricultural sector in Sudan constitutes the 
backbone of the Sudanese economy, but advances to this sector is relatively 
small. Commercial bank’s lending to agriculture was minimal and accounted for 
less than 1%  of their total credit  prior to 1990.With the aim of pooling 
resources for increased lending to agriculture a commercial Banks Consortium 
(CBC) was formed in 1992 .As a result, Commercial banks were instructed to 
channel one-third of their mandatory lending to agriculture through CBC. This 
policy substantially raised the share of agricultural lending in total commercial 
bank credit in 1990s, reaching 35.3 in 1993. 
 
  This trend has been gradually reversed since the start of the financial 
reform and liberalization program in 1997.By 2003, lending to agriculture 
amounted to only 12% of total bank credit (Elhiraika, 2005).The decline of credit 
to agriculture and according to (Kireyev 2001) is mainly attributed to the fear of 
banks which consider the risk of extending credit to all sectors, other than trade 
as being unjustifiable high. Credit to all other sectors, in particular to agriculture, 
is perceived by all banks as an extremely risky business because about 85% of all 
non performing loans originate in agriculture. In addition, some Islamic modes 
of financing (e.g. Salam and Musharaka) do not seem to be operationally 
efficient, in financing agriculture. Under Salem, banks often cannot sell in-kind 
repayments at a price allowing them even to recover the value of the initial 
credit. Some banks are reluctant to enter in a Musharaka contract with the 
agricultural producers because this mode of financing requires bank’s 
participation in the management of the financed project, which banks are not 
always willing to do. Figure (1) below shows the flow of finance extended by the 
commercial banks by  different mode of finance. The percentage share of all 
modes have increased expect Salam which has declined from SDD 16.1 billion 
in 2003 to SDD 24.6 billion in 2004. 
 
             Source:  Bank of Sudan Annual Reports (2003-2004). 



























2.2.2  iFnancial Sector Reform
(2) in Sudan 
             
         It is widely recognized that financial liberalization is an integral part 
of financial sector development .As such; policies on trade liberalization, interest 
rate deregulation, capital account opening may have an important implication on 
financial development and hence economic growth. However, a large body of 
literature to address the issue of the importance of financial liberalization in 
facilitating economic development and growth has been undertaken by many 
economists (see for example, Schumpeter (1911), McKinnon (1973) and Show 
(1973). 
 
              In Sudan, historical experience shows that sporadic attempts were 
undertaken to reform the financial system since independence in 1956.First 
attempts to reform the financial sector shown by the considerable attention that 
was given within the framework of the first economic plan to the importance of 
the financial sector for allocating credit for development projects. But, 
dissatisfaction with the banking institutions performance led the government to 
support “supply-leading finance approach”
(3) and thus got involved in the 
financial system by setting up specialized
 (4) financial institutions to cater for the 
financial needs of the different sectors of the economy. The second major 
development was the nationalization of the banking system in may 1970 as part 
of the whole nationalization policy adopted by Numiri regime. The third 
development was the adoption of the “Open-Door Policy” in 1977 to attract 
foreign investment and as a result both foreign and joint-venture commercial 
banks have been increased. 
 
           However,  among  these  processes  of  reforms,    the  islamization  of  the 
banking system in the early 1980’s following the announcement of the 
islamization of the entire Sudanese economy was the major financial sector 
reform in Sudan. Accordingly the banking sector became one of very few 




   The period since the early 1990’s has been the most crucial in recent 
economic history of Sudan as it is marked by the explicit commitment of the 
Sudanese government to a policy of market economy based on private sector. 
The government launched the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment 
                                                  
(2) The term “financial reform” is used interchangeably with the terms “financial liberalization”, 
“financial deregulation: and “financial deeping”. Financial reform is the process of moving or 
substantially reducing financial market distortions created by government intervention in setting 
interest rates and allocating credit. Financial reform may be a gradual process or sudden 
dismantling of all repressive regulations (Wilbert O.Bascom, 1994, the economics of financial 
reform in developing countries. The Macmillan press, Ltd, London 
 
(3) The supply –leading approach aims to create more developed financial institutions to cater for 
financial services that are likely to induce investment and hence economic growth. 
 
(4) Four Specialized banks were established, the Agricultural Bank of Sudan (1959), the Industrial 
Bank of Sudan (1961), the Estate Bank of Sudan (1967) and the Sudanese Saving Bank (1974). 
 
(5) In addition to Sudan, there are only two other countries, Iran and Pakistan, that have fully 
adopted the Islamic financial system. Approximately 50 other countries operate conventional 
interest-based banking system alongside Islamic financing.  9 
Program. The program included a variety of measures such as commodity price 
liberalization, privatization of some state-owned enterprises, reduced taxation of 
the corporate sector and, providing incentives to foreign investment. However, 
through these measures the program intends to stabilize the economy by 
reducing the rate of inflation, the fiscal deficit, the balance of payment deficit 
and developing the financial system by reforming it. 
 
        On the other hand, Reforms in the Sudan’s financial sector focused 
mainly on introducing some new measures with the aim of strengthening the 
financial system, notably the tightening of capital adequacy ratios and the 
establishment of new paid-in capital minimum. Previously, there had been no 
minimum capital requirements, and the introduction was designed both to make 
the sector more robust and to force Sudan’s smaller banks to merge. 
Classification and provisioning regulations against bad and suspect loans were 
also tightened, internal liquidity ratios revised upward and central bank 
monitoring and supervision requirements strengthened. In addition, the central 
bank reformed its liquidity management tools to encourage the development of a 
more active inter-bank local and foreign-currency market. In 1993, the Central 
bank of Sudan (CBOS), which is the monetary authority in the country 
“abolished the individual bank credit ceiling; Tightened conditions for extending 
lending to non-banks: and introduced requirements for inter-bank control, loan 
classifications and provision of capital adequacy (Kireyev, 2001). 
 
       It is worth mentioning that, the period (1997-2002) witnessed the first 
involvement of the IMF to monitoring the government macroeconomic 
stabilization package (program), which started in 1992.The financial sector 
reform program under the direct supervision of the IMF now consists of, 
tightening and reorienting monetary policy to lower the rate of inflation, 
introduce new instruments of indirect monetary policy control, abolishment of 
interest rate ceiling, credit ceiling and loan to priority sectors. The program also 
included deregulation, gradual opening up of the financial sector for foreign 
participation, privatization of banks and other financial institutions and 
increasing competition. 
 
    Controlling monetary growth was one of the key variables identified by the 
IMF when its adjustment programme was drawn up in 1997.As a result, the 
central bank of Sudan introduced in 1998 the central bank Musharaka (“profit 
sharing”) certificates (CMCs) as short- term instruments sold at weekly auctions 
to mop up liquidity. Longer-term Government Musharaka certificates were also 
established for the same purpose. In addition the central bank strengthened its 
monitoring of the commercial banks, required them to comply more closely with 
minimum reserve requirements, and established a discount window for short-
term bank credit. Extending credit by banks to the private sector is one of the 
major components of the IMF reform program. Between 1996 and 1998 
commercial banks claims on the private sector fell markedly in real terms, and 
even dropped in nominal terms between 1998 and 1999.To compact this, the 
central bank introduced a series of reforms
(6) in 2000 aimed at strengthening the 
                                                  
(6) The government introduced the comprehensive banking policy program (1999-2002) as part of 
its policy reform to developing and creating competent and efficient banking system to cope with 
the developments in the international monetary, financial and banking industry.   10 
(mainly state-owned) banks and increasing their commercial independence, 
while tightening supervision. 
 
    The reform program also included policies intended to reduce the role of 
the state in the management of banks. As such, there has been a move toward 
privatizing or part privatizing the state-owned commercial banks. The first bank 
to be sold is the Bank of Khartoum (Sudan’s oldest commercial bank), following 
a government announcement in late 2002 that it was seeking to sell a 74% stake 
to private investors, with the remaining 26% staying in state hands. The state-run 
agricultural bank (one of four specialized banks alongside the Real Estate bank, 
the saving and Social Development bank and the Workers bank) has also been 
the subject of restructuring. In addition, and to comply with the international 
standards on banking regulations, banks were required to meet the prudential 
ratios designated by the Basle committee.   
 
2.2.3  The Impact of Reforms
(7) 
                                            
              Following  the  reforms,  financial  intermediation  activity  has  certainly 
experienced relative expansion. The bank deposits have increased from around 6 
per cent of GDP in 1996 to 10.6 percent in 2002.Simalrly, the ratio of M3 to 
GDP rose from 9 per cent in 1997 to 11, 12, 14 per cent in 2000, 2001, 2002 
respectively. The other financial indicators such as non-performing loans, capital 
adequacy ratio and paid-up capital also, shows relative improvements (see Tabe3 
and 4). 
 
Table 3: Selected Monetary Ratios in Sudan: 1990-2002 
 










Deposits / GDP 
Ratio 
1990 17  0.42  47  20  8.9 
1991 14  0.37  49  18  7.4 
1992 15  0.30  67  21  11 
1993 16  0.35  70  21  9.5 
1994 14  0.46  60  17  9.9 
1995 13  0.29  60  17  10.1 
1996 9  0.76  58  11  6.1 
1997 8  9.97  58  9  6.1 
1998 8  9.6  63  9  6 
1999 10  9.5  64  9  5.9 
2000 11  8.57  61  11  6.6 
2001 12  8,7  56  12  8.1 
2002 14  7.8  55  14  10.6 
 
Source: World Bank development indicators, 2005 and own calculations  






                                                                                                                                       
(7) For more details on the impact of financial sector reform see (Kireyev, 2001). 
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Table 4: Sudan Financial Sector: Some Financial Indicators (2000-2004) 
 
 Monetary Indicators  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2000 
 Total Assets (M.SD)*  357.1 455.3 611.2 789.6 989.2 357.1 
 Paid-Up Capital (M.SD)  11.1 33.9 30.1 50.1 76.3 11.1 
 Capital- Adequacy ratio (%)  7.0 11.0 8.3  9.9 12.0 7.0 
 Expense/ Revenue Ratio (%)  65.5  54 51 46  71.1  65.5 
 Total Profits (M.SD)  5.4 5.7 7.9  17.9  21.5  5.4 
92.7  140.1 487.9 294.7 493.7  92.7 
79.2  111.4 160.0 216.0 461.3  79.2 
 Total Credits (M.SD): 
-  in Local Currencies 
-  in Foreign Currencies  15.3 28.7 33.2 78.7 32.4 15.3 
 Non-Performing Loans (%)  15.4 15.7 12.2 11.4  8.6  15.4 
 
*Note: (M.SD) stands for Milliard Sudanese Dinars 
Source: Bank of  Sudan Annual Reports (Various issues) 
      
Moreover the period of adjustment witnessed increased macroeconomic 
stability. Budget deficit/GDP ratio dropped drastically from 4.4 per cent in 
1993/93 to 1.8 percent in 2001.The rate of inflation has been reduced from more 
than 130 percent in 1996 to one single digit in 2000 and 2001 with an average of 
8 and 6 per cent respectively. In addition, the money supply growth rate ranges 
between 23 to 30 per cent during the period  (1999 –2002) from an average of 66 
per cent in 1996.This mainly due to the reduction of domestic credit and reform 
policies that have taken place in commercial banks ( see figure 2 &3). An 
impressive growth in real GDP has also been achieved negative trends in real 
GDP growth rate were reversed. The economy improved from -5% annual 
growth rates in 1990 (The pre-reform period) to relatively steady growth rate of 
about 6 per cent during the reform period. However, to ascribe this impressive 
performance in real GDP growth rate only to financial sector reform would be 
dubious. In 1991, the immediate year preceding the reform, real GDP grew by 8 
percent where as it dropped to 7, 5, and 1 percent in 1992, 1993 and 1994 
respectively (the first years of reforms). The channels through which the reform 
would have led to improved growth have been shown to deteriorate during the 
first years of the reform. Financial savings, efficiency, credit flow to the private 
sector became poorer during the reform period. Thus forces outside the financial 
sectors must have influenced the growth in real GDP.  
 
Figure (2): Money Supply Annual Growth Rate VS Inflation 
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Figure (3): GDP Growth Rate VS Money Supply
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     To sum up, the reform policy shown some progress specially in the 
relative success of stopping the disintermediation process. Some indicators have 
been improved during the  reform period but still remains lower if compared 
with other developing countries.  For instance, the ratio of broad money to GDP 
is about 10 percent in Sudan, compared with 30 to 40 percent in Pakistan, Kenya 
and Tanzania, and 50 to 90 percent in GCC countries (Jbili et. al., 1998). 
 
    However, in many respect, the financial sector is far to achieve the full 
efficiency since some recent reforms have not already produced their expected 
effect especially those designed to promote long-term savings mobilization and 
financing investment. 
 
3. Financial Sector Development and Growth:  
    A Brief Review of the Literature  
 
           Financial systems have long been recognized to play an important role in 
economic development and growth. Their role in economic growth has attracted 
much interest among academics, policy makers and economist around the world 
and has resulted in a large body of literature, both at the theoretical and empirical 
levels, that addresses the potential links between financial development and 
economic growth. 
 
The debate on the causal links between financial development and 
economic growth can be traced back to the pioneering contribution of Bagehot 
(1873), Schumpeter (1912), Gold Smith (1955). Cameron (1967), Hicks (1969), 
McKinnon (1973) and Show (1973). They all emphasized that; the financial 
sector would be a catalyst of economic growth if it were developed and healthy. 
However, well-functioning financial systems are able to mobilize savings, 
allocate resource efficiently, pooling risks, induce liquidity, and reducing 
transaction costs. In recent years, latter studies both theoretical and empirical 
have been carried out to examine the nature of the relationship between financial 
development and economic growth. Studies conducted by King and Levine 
(1993a, 1993b, 1993c), Rajan and Zingales (1998), Gibson and Tsakalatos 
(1994), Fry (1995), Levine and Zervos (1998), Okedokum (1998), all provide 
empirical evidence supporting this relationship. All point to the importance of an 
economy’s financial development for the growth of GDP real per capita income.  13 
      Throughout the survey of the literature, it was observed that, economists 
don’t all seem to agree on the importance of the role played by finance in 
promoting economic growth and consequently they hold different views 
regarding the theoretical link between financial development and economic 
growth.   Economists such as Schumpeter (1991), Gold smith (1969), King and 
Levine (1993a, 1993b), Fry (1978, 1988), McKinnon (1973) and Show (1973), 
have argued that more developed financial system promote or “lead” economic 
growth. Goldsmith (1969)’ for example, was the first to reveal the positive 
correlation between financial development and economic growth. This early 
work served as the impetus for those other researcher to delve further into this 
aspect of growth theory. Moreover, Schumpeter (1911) has highlighted the role 
played by the banking sector in allocating the necessary funds for promoting 
long- run growth. He proposes that the services provided by the financial sector 
are essential drivers for innovation and growth. 
 
          The above argument on the possible positive effect of the financial 
sector development on growth was also highlighted by McKinnon (1973) and 
show (1973). The McKinnon – Show School proposes that government 
quantitative restrictions on the banking system (such as interest ceiling, high 
reserve requirement and direct credit programs) restrain the volume and 
productivity of investment and impede the process of economic growth. The 
endogenous growth literature has revealed the same argument that financial 
development has a positive effect on economic growth (se for example, 
Bencivenga and Smith (1911), Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990). 
 
Contrary to the above hypothesis which states that, financial development 
lead economic growth, Robinson (1952) provides an alternatives view. She 
points out that finance does not exert a causal impact on growth. Instead 
financial development follows economic growth as a result of higher demand for 
financial services. In this case a financial institution is a mere reflection of the 
growth of the economic activity. Market participants simply acquire a demand 
for financial services that is a reflection of the entrepreneurial activities they are 
undertaking. Empirical support for this second view can also be found in some 
recent studies (Demetrides&Hussien (1996), Ireland (1994).  
      
        So far, empirical studies for the effects of financial development on 
economic growth have produced mixed evidence. Patrick (1966) reached in his 
study the conclusion that causation runs from financial to economic development 
(i.e. a supply leading relationship) in the early stage of development while the 
direction of causation  is reversed (i.e. a demand following relationship prevails) 
in the later stage. By employing the causality-testing framework proposed by 
Granger (1969), the same conclusion was arrived at by Fritz (1984) on the basis 
of data for Philippines. 
 
In some cross- section study, Jao (1976) found no role for financial 
development in explaining per capita real GDP.But in another, Wai (1980) 
evaluated the effects of real value of domestic credit on real GDP by employing 
time series data for each of 13 developing countries and significant positive 
impacts were detected in virtually all the countries. 
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      Many other empirical analysis of these issues have been undertaken since 
then, most of which provide further evidence of the positive relationship between 
financial sector development and growth (see for example, Lanyi and Saaloglu 
(1983), Gupta (1986), Glb (1989), Gertler & Rose (1994), Roubini &Sala-Martin 
(1992), Easter (1993) etc. King and Levine (1993a, 1993b, and 1993c) provided 
also the same evidence for 80 countries over the period 1960-1989.Using 
different measures of economic growth and financial development; they have 
shown that financial market development affects economic growth positively. 
The measures of economic growth they used are (a) the average growth rate of 
per captia real GDP (b) the average growth rate of capital, (c) the investment 
ratio (as a percentage of GDP), (d) a proxy of productivity investment. They used 
different financial development variables (a) liquid liabilities/GDP (b) 
commercial bank domestic credit/ (commercial bank domestic credit + central 
bank domestic credit), (c) claims on the non  - financial private sector/domestic 
credit and (d) gross claims on private sector/GDP. They found evidence of 
strong, positive relationship between the various financial development 
indicators of growth. 
  
  At the outset, it can be noted that, although numerous studies have been 
undertaken in this area on the importance of the impact of the banking sector 
development on economic growth, this paper contributes to this debate and 
improves on previous studies by using a new econometric technique called the 
ARDL framework proposed by Pesaran et al. (2001).The new framework 
reduces the shortcomings of small sample biases.  
 
4. Model, Data Sources and Methodology 
   4.1 Model and Data Sources 
 
            Following the literature (see, king and Levine 1993a, 1993b; Allen and 
Ndikumana 1998) and taking into account constraints relating to data availability 
in Sudan, we estimate the following model: 
    
GRGDP = f (TRD, INF, INV, GEX, CPS, or M3Y) 
 
  Economic growth is proxies with the variable GRGDP which is defined 
as the growth rate of real GDP. This is consistent with earlier studies (Gelb, 
1989; Roubini and Sala-I-Martin, 1992; King and Levine, 1993a, 1993b; 
Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; Allen and Ndikumana, 1998; Rousseau and 
Wachtel, 1998 and Beck, Levine and Loayza, 2000) on financial intermediation 
and economic growth. This measure provides a high indicative power of the 
quality and quantity of economic growth. 
 
     The selection of key variables to measure the level of financial services 
produced in the economy and to measure the extent and efficiency of financial 
intermediation is the major problem in an empirical study of this nature. 
Construction of financial development indicators is an extremely difficult task 
due to the diversity of financial services catered for in the financial system. What 
represent an appropriate measure of financial development (FD) seems to be 
controversial in the literature Several measures (proxies) representing the liquid  15 
liabilities of the financial system, such as M1/GDP, M2/GDP, or M3/GDP have 
been widely used in econometric models (see, for example, Goldsmith 1969, 
Gelb, 1989, World Bank, 1989, King and Levine 1993a, 1993b).These measures 
are not good proxies of financial development since they are likely to measure 
the extent to which transactions are monetized rather than the ability of the 
financial system to channel funds from depositors to investment opportunities As 
an alternative measure, bank credit to the private sector is often argued to be a 
more superior measure of functioning financial development because it is a 
measure of the quality and quantity of investment (see De Gregario and Guidotti, 
1995, Demetriades and Hussein, 1996 Levine et al, 2000 for similar argument). 
 
          In the light of the preceding arguments, and to ensure robustness, we use 
two alternative measures of financial market development. The first proxy for 
financial development (FD) is the ratio of M3/GDP denoted by M3Y. M3 as a 
percentage of GDP has become a standard measure of financial depth and an 
indicator of the overall size of financial intermediary activity in cross-country 
studies. The choice of M3Y may be seen in accordance with the inside money 
model of McKinnon (1973) where the accumulation of real money balances is a 
required condition for investment. An increase in M3Y may be interpreted as an 
improvement in financial deeping in the economy.  
     The second proxy of financial development is the value of credit offers 
by the commercial banks to the private sector divided by GDP denoted by CBS 
is used to measure the private sector financing role of commercial banks and is in 
line with De Gregario and Guidotti (1995). This proxy does not include credit to 
the private sector by non-deposit money banks, the central bank; credit issued to 
governments or public enterprises and hence is an exclusive measure of the 
intermediary role of commercial banks. This proxy represents the financial 
intermediary in one of its main function namely that of credit intermediation by 
channelling savings to investors. .This indicator represents an accurate indicator 
(proxy) of functioning of financial development because it is a measure of the 
ability of the banking system to provide finance-led growth (Levine and Zervos, 
1998). 
            Clearly, factors other than financial development impact on economic 
growth. We therefore introduce control variables that have been shown 
empirically to be robust determinants of growth in the literature. These control 
variables include, a measure of openness to trade (TRD), inflation (INF), gross 
investment as percent of GDP (INV) and, size of government (GEX). 
 
     The effects of internal trade on growth are captured by openness variable, 
which is measured as the sum of imports and exports as a percentage of nominal 
GDP (Levine et al, 2000). Theoretically the effects of trade can be positive or 
negative, as such, the net effects can be determined only empirically. The 
inflation rate and extent of government expenditure are commonly used as 
indicators of macroeconomic stability (Eastrly and Rebelo, 1993; Fischer, 1993; 
Allen and Ndikumana 1993, and Levine et al, 2000). High inflation distorts 
economic activity and reduces investment in productive enterprises, thus 
reducing economic growth. This study uses change in inflation rate. Government 
expenditure could reduce economic growth because of the crowding out effect on  16 
private investment and the inflationary pressure it can lead to (Allen and 
Ndikumana (1998). This study employs the ratio of government expenditure to 
GDP as a measure of the size of the government. The share of investment in 
GDP is considered as one of the few economic variables that have robust effect 
on economic growth (Levine and Renelt, 1992). 
 
    In addition to the five variables described above we introduced a dummy 
variable which takes the value of zero from 1970 to 1990 and the value of one 
afterwards, to account for the islamization program of the banking system 
launched in Sudan during 1990’s. Accordingly, we estimate two versions of the 
model to investigate the impact of financial development on real output in 
Sudan, using annual time series data for the period 1970 to 2004.The two models 
are:  
 
Model 1:   
 
GRGDPt = α 0 + α l INVt+ α 2 ∆lnGEXt+ α 3 ∆lnTRDt+ α 4 ∆lnM3Yt+ α 5 
TRENDt + α 6 D90t+ε1t 
 
Model 2:  
 
GRGDPt = β  0 +  β  l INVt + β  2∆ lnINFt +β  3  ∆ lnGEXt+β  4∆ lnCBSt+β  5 
TRENDt 
+β 6 D90t+ε2t 
  
   Here, INV is ln (I/ Yt-1) which refers to the log ratio of investment over  
real  GDP from the previous year. ∆lnGEX is the log difference of government 
spending. ∆lnTRD is the log difference of trade openness. ∆lnINF is the  log 
difference of inflation. D90 is a dummy variable and  TREND refers to the time 
trend and ε is a white noise error term. 
 
       Data are obtained from the World Bank’s Development indicators 2005 
CD-ROM and various issues of the Central Bank of Sudan Annual Reports. All 
variables in our data set are expressed in natural logarithms and the time span of 
the study ranges annually from 1970 to 2004.The choice of annual data is due to 
the fact that most of the available data are reported annually. Furthermore, 
researchers like (Shiller and Perron, 1985; Campbell and Perron, 1991 and 
Hakkio and Rush, 1991) found that the power of the time series analysis with 
particular emphasis on co-integration lies in the span of data rather than the 
number of observations. It is for these reasons that in this study annual data is 
used. 
 
4.2 Econometric Methodology 
 
  This study utilises the newly proposed autoregressive distributed (ARDL) 
bounds test proposed by Pesaran, et al. (2001) to examine the co- integration 
relationship between financial development and economic growth..This 
procedure has several advantages over several methods available for conducting 
the co-integration test such as two-step residual based Engle-Granger (1987) test, 
and the maximum likelihood based Johansen (1991; 1995) and Johansen-Juselius  17 
(1990) tests. The main advantage of ARDL modeling lies in its flexibility that it 
can be applied when the variables are of different order of integration (Pesaran 
and Pesaran1997). Another advantage of this approach is that the ARDL is more 
appropriate measure in the case of small samples, while the Johansen co-
integration techniques still require large data samples for the purpose of validity. 
Given that our sample size is limited with a total of 35 observations only, 
conducting bounds test will be appropriate. 
 
      Moreover, the ARDL modelling approach to co integration, involves 
OLS estimation of an unrestricted Error Correction Model ( ECM) of the 
following type as a first stage: 
 























ki ∆X1, t-i + ε1t 
 
 Where  ∆ is the difference operator, α0 is a constant, T is a time trend, Y is 
the dependent variable, Xi (i = 1, 2, . . . , k) are explanatory variables,  ε  is the 
error term, p and q are maximum lag orders, and the rest are coefficients. 
 
  The implementation of ARDL approach involves two stages. At the first 
stage, the existence of the long-run relation between variables under 
investigation is tested by computing the F-statistics for testing the significance of 
the lagged levels of the variables in the error-correction form of the underling the 
ARDL model. Pesaran et al (1996) tabulated two sets of appropriate critical 
values for different number of regressors (k), and whether the model contains an 
intercept or trend or both. One set assumes that all the variables in the ARDL 
model are of 1(0), and another assumes all the variables are 1(1).If the F-statistic 
lies above the upper bound critical value for a given significance level; the 
conclusion is that there is a non-spurious long-run level relationship with the 
dependent variable. If the F-statistic lies below the lower bound critical value, 
the conclusion is that there is no long-run level relationship with the dependent 
variable. If it lies between the lower and the upper limits, the result is 
inconclusive. The general form of the null and alternative hypotheses for the F-
statistic test is as follows: 
 
H0: (φ1 = φ2 = … = φk = 0) 
H1: (φ1 ≠  0, = φ2 ≠  0,. . ., φk ≠  0) 
  
     At the second stage of analysis one can estimate the long-run coefficient 
and make inference about their values. The estimate of the long-run coefficients 
may differ depending upon the model selection criteria used. In our case the 
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) is used. In this step, the resulting underlying 
ARDL equation is also verified with all its statistical diagnostic properties in 
order to get unbiased and consistent/efficient estimates. The test for serial 
correlation, functional form, normality and heteroscedasticity are carried out to 
ensure that the models are well specified and congruent with data. The error 
correction version of ARDL equation can then, be estimated in this stage. The  18 
adjustment parameter, as reflected in the coefficient of error correction term 
indicates the extent of adjustment of the dependent variable to the deviations 
from its long-run equilibrium value.           
 
5. Empirical Results 
     5.1 Unit Root Test Results 
 
Before analyzing the estimated results using ARDL approach to co 
integration, we first begin by investigating the non-stationarity (the presence of 
unit roots) in all variables by applying the Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) test. 
These tests examine the null hypothesis that the considered variable has a unit 
root versus the alternative hypothesis that the variable is stationary. However, a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for co integration is that each of the 
variables should be integrated of the same order, and the order must be greater 
than or equal to one. The ADF tests results presented in table (5) clearly reveals 
that all the financial variables along with the selected growth variables are 
integrated at order 1, 1(1), i.e., they become stationary after first differencing. 
 
Table 5: Unit Root Test Results 
 
ADF test 
Variables levels  Ist differenced 
GRGDP  -I.21345 -  4.3433*** 
lnINV  -0.54321 -6.04444** 
lnGEX  - 2.10121  -3.2317** 
lnINF  -1.56112 -5.1455*** 
LnTRD  -2.21211 -6.0216* 
LnCBS  -2.23451 -3.55555** 
LnM3Y  -1.3212 -8.07288*** 
 
 Note: (1) Critical values follow McKinnon (1991) 
           (2) One, two and three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%  and  10% levels respectively.  
 
   In the first step of the ARDL analysis we tested for the presence of long-
run relationships in model (1) and model (2).Given the fact that we have annual 
time series data and limited number of observations (35), the lag length will be 
restricted to two, that is, n = 2.Table (6) reports results of the bound test for the 
existence of a long run relationship. As shown in the table the calculated F-
statistics in the two models, FRLGDP (.) is higher than the upper bound critical 
value. For model 1 FRLGDP (.) is higher than the upper critical value at the 1% 
level and in model 2, FRLGDP (.) is higher than the upper bound critical value at 
5% level. This implying that the null hypothesis of no co-integration cannot be 
accepted and that there is indeed a co- integration relationship among the 
variables in each of the models. 
 
Table 6: F-Statistics Test for Long Run Co-integration 
 
                                                Critical value bounds of the F-statistics 
  1% Level  5% Level  Calculated F.statistics 
Model  1(0) 1(1) 1(0)  1(1)   
1  3.668 4.978 2.945  4.088  6.876 
2  3.668 4.978 2.945  4.088  7.432 
 
             *Critical values were obtained from Pesaran  & Pesaran (1997) 
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            Having found a long run relationship, we applied the ARDL method to 
estimate the long run and the short run coefficients. The results for each of the 
models are reported in tables 7 and 8 for the long-run and 9 and 10 for short -run 
respectively. 
 
        For model I, table (7) shows the results of the long- run relationship 
between the dependent variable GRGDP and the other regressors. As expected, 
the investment variable has the expected positive sign. But despite the fact that, 
the level of investment exerts a positive and statistically significant impact on 
real GDP in the long run, the relationship between them in term of elasticises 
remains very weak i.e. a one percent increase in investment leads to a respective 
real GDP increase of 0.20 only. This indicates that investment in Sudan does not 
have an important effect on real GDP. This weak relationship between 
investment and real GDP is attributed usually to the prevailing situations of 
political instability, prolonged civil wars, and other factors such as uncertainty 
over agricultural leases which resulted in declining investment, particularly in 
major agricultural projects. The government spending variable also appears with 
the correct sign and is statistically significant at 10 percent level. The results 
suggest that a one percent increase in government spending leads to -0.396 
decrease in real GDP. The negative relationship between government spending 
and real GDP is logical because governments usually tend to increase spending 
during poor economic conditions to boost the economy. Openness, measured as 
the sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP, does not seem to have a 
significant effect on real GDP.The estimated coefficient is positive (0.001) and 
statistically insignificant. The financial sector variable affects negatively real 
GDP in Sudan but the estimated coefficient is highly significant in the case of 
M3Y and insignificant with the credit variable. This result indicates – as we have 
mentioned before - that, forces outside the financial sectors may have influenced 
the growth in real GDP. The time trend which is significant shows that there has 
been an upward trend in real GDP, much of which could be explained in terms of 
the impact of the package’s success of the structural adjustment program and the 
export of oil. The dummy variable is negative and significant indicating that the 
implementation and adoption of Islamic modes of finance might cause adverse 
effects on real GDP. 
 
Table 7: Long-Run Estimates of Model 1: Autoregressive  
Distributed Lag Estimates 
 
Repressor Coefficient  t-value  P-value 
∆ LnINV  0.200 4.1184   [0.000] 
∆ LnINV(-1)  0.170 4.551   [0.002] 
∆ LnGEX  -0.396 -5.0467   [0.000] 
LnTRD  0.0011  0.038     [0.970] 
∆ LnM3Y  -0.3339  -5.679     [0.000] 
∆ LnM3Y(-1)  -0.26 -3.961    [0.001] 
CONST  19.484  13.6857     [0.000] 
TREND  0.01724  5.2638     [0.000] 
D90  -0.10594 -2.3003    [0.032] 
 
                     Note: Dependent variable is GRGDP and ARDL (1,1,2,0,1) is  selected based on Schwarz 
Bayesian Criterion 




  For model 2, credit provided by the banking sector over GDP is used 
instead of M3Y as a financial variable, whereas inflation variable now included 
in model 2 to assess the strength of an independent link between financial sector 
development and economic growth. However, these replacements produce no 
significant change in the results obtained above in model 1(see 8).The 
investment variable again is significant and with low positive coefficient value. 
Government spending still has the expected negative sign but with marginal 
significant value. As expected the sign of inflation coefficient is negative. This is 
logical, because high rates of inflation can be expected to reduce economic 
growth through a variety of mechanisms which can influence both the rate of 
capital accumulation and the rate of growth of total factor productivity. 
 
As has been assumed, private credit provided by commercial banks has a 
direct positive impact on real GDP in the long run and negative impact in the 
short run. This is justified by the fact that, private sector financing alone cannot 
augment economic growth as it has to be combined effectively with the other 
factors in the economy. In the short run if the mix of factors is such that there is 
too much private sector financing relative to the other economic factors, it may 
yield negative marginal returns and hence seem to have a negative impact on real 
GDP. However, in the long-run, all other factors are able to vary in tandem with 
the increased private sector financing by commercial banks and this is reflected 
in the observed positive impact on real GDP. The results of tables 7&8 shows 
that, the coefficient of credit to the private sector by banks is negative and 
insignificant in both the long and short run in Sudan, thus implying that increases  
credit to the private sector by banks will not boost private investment as the 
theory suggests.  Our explanation for the negative impact of credit by bank on 
Real GDP could be that the institutional environment surrounding of its private 
sector is characterised by a lack of strong business and professional 
organisations. Furthermore, banks through which credits to the private sector are 
channelled, also, lack of personnel with experience and expertise in credit 
analysis. 
 
  To sum up, the weak and insignificant relationship between financial 
development indicators and real GDP is rather surprising since economic theory 
suggests otherwise. These results are however not unique. Same results were 
obtained earlier by (e.g. Gertler & Rose, 1991; Gregorio & Guidotti, 
1995).Similarly, Block and Tang (2003) in their testing for the causal 
relationship between financial development and economic growth of 75 countries 
they found that only 26 showed positive relationship with just one country 
having a significant coefficient .Al-Yousif (2002),attributed this negative 
correlation between the two variables to the act  of business cycle and the  weak 
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Table 8: Long-Run Results of Model 2: Autoregressive  
Distributed Lag Estimates 
      
 Repressor  Coefficient t-value  P-  value 
∆ LnINV  0.117 3.77  [0.001] 
∆ LnINV(-1)  0.175 5.633  [0.000] 
∆ LnGEX  -0.234 -1.876 [0.074] 
∆ LnINF  -0.014 -1.914 [0.690] 
∆ LnCBS  -0.047 -1.711 [0.101] 
∆ LnCBS (-1)  0.0160 0.564 [0.570] 
∆ LnCBS(-2)  -0.118 -3.944 [0.001] 
CONST  3.507 2.939  [0.000] 
TREND  0.0017 0.450  [  0.032] 
D90  -0.489 -0.01 [0.986] 
 
Note: Dependent variable is GRGDP and ARDL (1,0,1,0,2) is  selected based on Schwarz Bayesian 
Criterion 
 
5.2 Short Run Dynamics 
 
The fact that the variables in our model are co- integrated provides 
support for the use of an error correction model mechanism (ECM) 
representation in order to investigate the short run dynamics. The estimates of 
the  error – correction model are given in tables (9) and (10) for both model 1 
and model 2. The adjusted R-squared of the error correction model is 0.75 and 
0.79 in model 1 and model 2 respectively, implying  that the fit of the models in 
each case is  good. Also, the short-run models pass all  the diagnostic tests for 
autocorrelation, functional form, normality of the residuals and 
heteroscedasticity, and supports the overall validity of the short run model.  
 
It is known that the error correction term ECt-1 measures the speed of 
adjustment to restore equilibrium in the dynamic model. The ECt-1 coefficient 
shows how quickly/slowly variables return to equilibrium and it should have a 
statistically significant coefficient with a negative sign. Bannerjee et al. (1998) 
states that a highly significant error correction term is further proof of the 
existence of a stable long-term relationship. Tables (9) and (10), shows that the 
error term ECt-1  is statistically significant in each model with the expected 
negative sign. This confirms once again, the existence of the co- integration 
relationship among the variables of these two models. The coefficients of ECt-1   
are equal to (-0.37) and (-0.20) for models (1) and (2) respectively and imply that 
deviations from the long-term growth rate in GDP are corrected by 37 percent in 
model (1) and 20 percent in model (2) between two successive time periods. This 
means that the adjustment takes place relatively quickly in model 1 and 2. 
          
Table 9: Error –Correction Estimates of Model 1 
    
Repressor Coefficient  t-value  P-value 
∆LnINV  0.098 2.76  [0.011] 
∆LnGEX  -0.460 -1.876  [0.004] 
∆LnGEX1  0.323 -1.914  [0.023] 
∆LnTRD  -0.001 -1.711  [0.970] 
∆LnM3Y  0.042 0.564  [0.515] 
∆CONST  5.810 2.939  [0.000] 
∆TREND  0,011 -0.450  [  0.004] 
∆D90  -0.106 -0.0176  [0.030] 
ECM(-1)  -0.373 -4.142  [0.000] 
R
2   0.75                                                                                                  S.E. of regression  
0.035 





Note: ECM - ARDL (1, 0, 1, 0, 2) Selected based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion  22 
Table 10:  Error –correction estimates of model 2 
 
Repressor Coefficient  t-value  P-value 
∆LnINV  0.1174 3.77 [0.001] 
∆LnGEX  -02338 -1.8775 [0.73] 
∆LnINF  -0.0138 -1.914 [0.068] 
∆LnCBS  -0.0472 -1.710 [0.100] 
∆LnCBS1  0.1184 3.944 [0.001] 
∆CONST  3.507 2.939  [0.007] 
∆TREND  -0.0017 0.450 [  0656] 
∆D90  -0.4899 -0.0176 [0.986] 
ECM(-1)  -0.203 -2.562  [0.017] 
R2   0.79                                                                                               S.E. of regression  
0.033 




Note: ECM - ARDL (1, 0, 1, 0, 2) selected based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
 
5.3- Testing for the stability of the model 
 
To complement this study it is important to investigate whether the above 
long run and short run relationships we found are stable for the entire period of 
study. The stability of the model is evaluated using the  cumulative sum 
(CUSUM) and the cumulative sum of squares (CUSUMSQ) of the recursive 
residual test for structural stability proposed by Brown et al. (1975).A graphical 
representation of CUSUM AND CUSUMQ statistics are shown in fig.4 and 
fig.5. If the plot of the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ remains  within the 5 per cent 
critical bound the null hypothesis that all coefficients are stable cannot be 
rejected. As it is clear from fig.4 and fig.5 ,the plots of both the CUSUM and the  
CUSUMQ are within the boundaries and hence these statistics confirm the 
stability of the long run coefficients of the RGDP function in model 1 and 2. 
 
Fig. 4: Plots of CUSUM and CUSUMQ statistics for stability test (model1) 
 
Plot of Cumulative Sum of Recursive 
Residuals 
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Fig. 5: Plots of CUSUM and CUSUMQ statistics for stability test (model 2) 
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6. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 
The study attempts to evaluate the impact of financial development on 
real GDP in Sudan using a more robust econometric technique, the ARDL 
framework. Our findings suggest that that the financial development indicators 
does not have a direct impact on real output.These weak findings may be 
attributed to the inefficient allocation of resources by banks, along with the 
absence of an appropriate investment climate required to foster significant 
private investment and promote growth in the long run, and to the poor quality of 
credit disbursal of the banking sector in Sudan. Moreover, the econometric 
analysis of the model shows that the other macroeconomic variables provide 
little proof in explaining real GDP growth in Sudan. Although, the level of 
investment exerts a positive and statistically significant impact on real GDP in 
the long run, the relationship between them in term of elasticises remains very 
weak i.e. a one percent increase in investment leads to a respective real GDP 
increase of 0.20 only. Government spending and inflation variables appear with 
the correct sign but with mixed results in the short and long run. For example, 
government spending variable is statistically significant for model 1 in both the 
short and long run analysis, but it is insignificant in model 2 when we replacing 
trade openness by inflation variable.  The results also showed that the error 
correction coefficients, which determine the speed of adjustment, had an 
expected and highly significant negative sign. Also, both models have passed all 
the diagnostic tests for autocorrelation, functional form, normality of the 
residuals and heteroscedasticity, and support the overall validity of the short run 
model.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the financial sector reform conducted in Sudan in 
the early 1990s was mainly to accumulate financial savings to finance productive 
investment endeavours and hence promote long term economic growth. But, the 
Sudanese experience of financial reform show that enhanced investment has not 
taken place yet, and that growth performance is far from being satisfactory in a 
country where 40 percent of the population lives below the national poverty line.    
 
       One of the most obvious implications of our results is that if Sudan is to 
realize its target growth rate it needs to create a stable political and economic 
climate conducive to investment. It follows from this that political stability and 








Under Musharaka the investment is necessarily be implemented between two or 
more parties, each of them contribute a share of the total capital. It works 
according to the following conditions; 
1. The capital of Musharaka  is generally paid in liquid money; however, 
payment in kind is also acceptable. In this case, the value of that property (not 
the property of per se) is considered for determining the percentage age of his  25 
contribution to the capital and his obligations toward any liability. 
2. A partner ought to enjoy full legal capacity to act on his own and on behalf of 
others (partners) with respect to the different dealings of Musharaka. 
3. The means by which profits and losses are distributed among partners must be 
stated. 
4. It is acceptable for a partner who contribute more effort than others and/or 
who enjoys more experience to take a %age in profit in lieu of his extra labor and 
expertise but losses are always incurred in direct proportion to the respective 




Mudaraba is a special type of Musharaka. In a Mudaraba contract, one partner 
contributes the capital and the other partner provides labour and expertise. 
Common conditions for this mode of Islamic finance include: 
1. Capital of Al-Mudaraba  must be identified, known to the parties, and 
delivered to the investor (entrepreneur), and it should, under no circumstances, 
be a debt resting with the investor (entrepreneur). 
2. The duty of the investor (entrepreneur) is to exert his best effort for investing 
the capital and at the same time to take all precautionary measures to protect the 
assets of the project under the Mudaraba financing. 
3. The investor (entrepreneur) is a trustee. He is, therefore, under no obligation to 
guarantee any damage or loss incurred in the due process of investment. In this 
case, the damage and loss are borne by the investor (entrepreneur). However, the 
investor (entrepreneur) is pounded to pay any damages and bear losses if he 
transgresses the limits as a trustee, through will-full acts, negligence and breach 
of contract. 
4. The distribution of the profit must be explicitly agreed to and in such a way as 
to ensure its distribution between the parties i.e. in percentage. However, losses 




Al Muzara'a is a type of sharecropping agricultural partnership. Traditionally the 
landowner would provide the land and inputs while the farmer provides labour. 
The yield is distributable among the partners in accordance with their 
predetermined contract. The increasing cost of inputs and production often lead 
to changing the formula. Some new forms may be illustrated as follows: the 
contract of Muzara'a may be undertaken by: 
1. The landowner, the expert farmer and the owner of irrigation scheme. 
2. The landowner who also undertakes to administer the farm and the bank that 




The steps to be followed for the formation of this sale contract may be 
summarized as follows: 
1. The intending buyer asks the would-be seller creditor (Islamic bank) to buy a 
commodity, the intending buyer promises to buy that commodity for mark-up 
price (margins) that is determined by the monetary authorities.  26 
2. If the creditor (Islamic bank) agrees to enter into that transaction, it has to buy 
the demanded commodity from the original owner according to the guidelines of 
the commodity under financing. 
3. Having that commodity, creditor (Islamic bank) has to make a fresh offer -
depending of course on the previous negotiations and promise to the buyer. 
4. According to the preponderant Shariah point of view and despite his previous 
promise, the buyer has the right to accept or reject that offer, and in case of 
acceptance, a valid contract of sale is concluded between the two parties. 
5. In case of rejecting the offer, the ownership of the community rests with 




Istisna'a is a sale contract whereby the buyer asks the seller to manufacture and 
sell a commodity well defined. Or that the seller commodity might be specified 
without necessarily manufacturing it, e.g. forming a contract with a factory for 
agricultural capital goods, and other inputs to be delivered by specification 
within a definite period of time. The dominate point of view among jurists is to 
the effect that the contract of Istisna'a is not obligatory on the two parties i.e. any 
one of them has the right to withdraw without a prior notice. However, among 
leading Hanafi's jurists there is an opinion that Istisna'a  is as binding on its 
parties as any other pecuniary contract. This view is the more acceptable one for 




Ijarah refers to a leasing contract in which some specified assets (e.g. tractor) are 
leased for use by a farmer/client according to an agreed price and for a specific 
period of time. 
Salam: 
 
Salam is a special type of sale contract, which is valid for both agricultural and 
industrial products. It is exactly the reverse of the deferred sale. In this contract, 
the price has to be paid immediately, whereas, the delivery of the commodity 
agreed on with specifications has to take place at a specific future period. The 
following terms must be satisfied for the validity of the contract of Salam. 
1. The price (known as capital of Al-Salam) must be identified and known 
2. The price should be paid immediately after the constitution of the contract. 
Nevertheless, a delay for short period is condensable according to the Maliki 
School. 
3. The sold commodity must be known by specifications, in order to provide the 
seller with wide room to get the commodity from wherever it is available. 
4. Its delivery should be postponed to a specific time in the future; therefore, the 
availability of the commodity in the market is usually the main determining 
factor for fixing a time in the contract. 
5. To avoid uncertainty, the place of delivery has to be stated in the contract. 
6. The seller ought not to have stipulated that he would honor his obligation from 
specific source such as his farm or farms in specific area. Therefore, if the seller 
is unable to secure the commodity due to its unavailability in the markets, the  27 
buyer has two options; either to wait for its availability or to resign the contract 
and recover the paid up price. 
 
Source: Alherika (2004) 
 
Appendix 2: Recent Islamic Monetary Policy Tools in Sudan 
 
(1) Central Bank Musharaka Certificates (CMCs) 
The Bank of Sudan introduces these certificates in June 1998.They were 
issued by the Sudan Financial Services Company (SFSC) on behalf of the 
Bank of Sudan and the government of Sudan. Essentially they represent a 
limited umber of shares in a special fund composed of the pool of 
government investments in nine commercial banks. The CMCs allow its 
owner to share with the bank of Sudan and the ministry of finance the 
benefit of investing in banks wholly or partially owned by them. The High 
Shari’a Supervisory Board (HSSB) approved these certificates for the 
banking system and other financial institutions as the first Islamic interest 
free instrument used to manage liquidity and conduct open market 
operations. 
The utilization of CMCs to conduct open market operations are considered 
to be more effective in influencing liquidity when compared with the 
statutory reserve ratio. If the bank of Sudan wishes to reduce liquidity of 
the commercial banks, then it would sell certificates with the amount of 
money it wants to withdraw from the banks, and the reverse is true, if it 
wishes to pump liquidity into the national economy. 
 
(2) Government  Musharaka Certificates (GMCs) 
 
The Government Musharaka Certificates (GMCs) are also equity-based 
financial securities that were introduced in 1999, as an Islamic-oriented 
means for financing the budget deficit. It offers the Bank of Sudan an 
additional effective tool for liquidity management. These certificates allow 
their owner to share the profit or a loss resulting from the operations of all 
government companies and corporations whose equity capital constitutes 
the fund from which these certificates were issued. The issuing of these 
certificates achieves the following objectives: 
a-  Managing liquidity on the macroeconomic level through open market 
operations (OMO) 
b- Covering part of the budget deficit instead of printing more paper 
money by the bank of Sudan. Accumulating national savings and 
encouraging investment through increasing awareness among the 
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ﺱﺎﺒﻌﻟﺍ ﻢﺳﺎﻘﻠﺑ ﺱﺎﺒﻌﻟﺍ ﻢﺳﺎﻘﻠﺑ ﺱﺎﺒﻌﻟﺍ ﻢﺳﺎﻘﻠﺑ ﺱﺎﺒﻌﻟﺍ ﻢﺳﺎﻘﻠﺑ 
 ﺕﺎﻣﻮﻈﻨﻣ  ﺕﺎﻣﻮﻈﻨﻣ  ﺕﺎﻣﻮﻈﻨﻣ  ﺕﺎﻣﻮﻈﻨﻣ ﺔﻴﺠﻴﻠﳋ ﻞﻤﻌﻟﺍ ﻕﺍﻮﺳﻷ ﺕﺎﻣﻮﻠﻌﳌﺍ ﺔﻴﺠﻴﻠﳋ ﻞﻤﻌﻟﺍ ﻕﺍﻮﺳﻷ ﺕﺎﻣﻮﻠﻌﳌﺍ ﺔﻴﺠﻴﻠﳋ ﻞﻤﻌﻟﺍ ﻕﺍﻮﺳﻷ ﺕﺎﻣﻮﻠﻌﳌﺍ ﺔﻴﺠﻴﻠﳋ ﻞﻤﻌﻟﺍ ﻕﺍﻮﺳﻷ ﺕﺎﻣﻮﻠﻌﳌﺍ  
API/WPS 9803  Adil Abdalla  The Impact of Euro-Mediterranean Partnerships on Trade Interests of 
the OIC Countries 
API/WPS 9804 
ﻝﺎﻫﺩ ﺽﺎﻳﺭ ﻝﺎﻫﺩ ﺽﺎﻳﺭ ﻝﺎﻫﺩ ﺽﺎﻳﺭ ﻝﺎﻫﺩ ﺽﺎﻳﺭ 
ﺝﺎﳊﺍ ﻦﺴﺣ ﺝﺎﳊﺍ ﻦﺴﺣ ﺝﺎﳊﺍ ﻦﺴﺣ ﺝﺎﳊﺍ ﻦﺴﺣ 





DOMESTIC DEMAMD FOR PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN OPEC 
API/WPS 9806  Imed Limam 
Adil Abdalla  Inter-Arab Trade and the Potential Success of AFTA 
API/WPS 9901  Karima Aly Korayem  Priorities of Social Policy Measures and the Interset of Low-Income 
People; the Egyptian Case 
API/WPS 9902  Sami Bibi  A Welfare Analysis of the Price System Reforms’ Effects on Poverty in 
Tunisia 
API/WPS 9903  Samy Ben Naceur 
Mohamed Goaied  The Value Creation Process in The Tunisia Stock Exchange 
API/WPS 9904  ﺶﻴﻨﻟﺍ ﺓﺎﳒ ﺶﻴﻨﻟﺍ ﺓﺎﳒ ﺶﻴﻨﻟﺍ ﺓﺎﳒ ﺶﻴﻨﻟﺍ ﺓﺎﳒ  ﺔﻴﻌﻴﺒﻄﻟﺍ ﺩﺭﺍﻮﳌﺍ ﺔﺤﺷﻭ ﻲﺌﻴﺒﻟﺍ ﺭﻮﻫﺪﺘﻟﺍ ﻒﻴﻟﺎﻜﺗ ﺔﻴﻌﻴﺒﻄﻟﺍ ﺩﺭﺍﻮﳌﺍ ﺔﺤﺷﻭ ﻲﺌﻴﺒﻟﺍ ﺭﻮﻫﺪﺘﻟﺍ ﻒﻴﻟﺎﻜﺗ ﺔﻴﻌﻴﺒﻄﻟﺍ ﺩﺭﺍﻮﳌﺍ ﺔﺤﺷﻭ ﻲﺌﻴﺒﻟﺍ ﺭﻮﻫﺪﺘﻟﺍ ﻒﻴﻟﺎﻜﺗ ﺔﻴﻌﻴﺒﻄﻟﺍ ﺩﺭﺍﻮﳌﺍ ﺔﺤﺷﻭ ﻲﺌﻴﺒﻟﺍ ﺭﻮﻫﺪﺘﻟﺍ ﻒﻴﻟﺎﻜﺗ  :  :  :  : ﺔﻴﺑﺮﻌﻟﺍ ﻝﻭﺪﻟﺍ ﰲ ﻖﻴﺒﻄﺘﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﻠﺑﺎﻗﻭ ﺔﻳﺮﻈﻨﻟﺍ ﲔﺑ ﺔﻴﺑﺮﻌﻟﺍ ﻝﻭﺪﻟﺍ ﰲ ﻖﻴﺒﻄﺘﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﻠﺑﺎﻗﻭ ﺔﻳﺮﻈﻨﻟﺍ ﲔﺑ ﺔﻴﺑﺮﻌﻟﺍ ﻝﻭﺪﻟﺍ ﰲ ﻖﻴﺒﻄﺘﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﻠﺑﺎﻗﻭ ﺔﻳﺮﻈﻨﻟﺍ ﲔﺑ ﺔﻴﺑﺮﻌﻟﺍ ﻝﻭﺪﻟﺍ ﰲ ﻖﻴﺒﻄﺘﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﻠﺑﺎﻗﻭ ﺔﻳﺮﻈﻨﻟﺍ ﲔﺑ  
API/WPS 9905  Riad Dahel  Volatility in Arab Stock Markets 
API/WPS 9906  Yousef Al-Ebraheem 
Bassim Shebeb 
IMPORTED INTERMEDIATE INPUTS: IMPACT ON ECONOMIC 
GROWTH 
API/WPS 9907  Magda Kandil  Determinants and Implications of Asymmetric Fluctuations: Empirical 




M. Nagy Eltony  Oil Price Fluctuations and their Impact on  the Macroeconomic 
Variables of Kuwait: A Case Study Using a VAR Model  
 
API/WPS 9909  ﺭﺩﺎﻘﻟﺍ ﺪﺒﻋ ﻲﻠﻋ ﺭﺩﺎﻘﻟﺍ ﺪﺒﻋ ﻲﻠﻋ ﺭﺩﺎﻘﻟﺍ ﺪﺒﻋ ﻲﻠﻋ ﺭﺩﺎﻘﻟﺍ ﺪﺒﻋ ﻲﻠﻋ   ﺔﻴﺑﺮﻌﻟﺍ ﻝﺍﻮﻣﻷﺍ ﺱﻭﺅﺭ ﺓﺩﺎﻋﺇ  ﺔﻴﺑﺮﻌﻟﺍ ﻝﺍﻮﻣﻷﺍ ﺱﻭﺅﺭ ﺓﺩﺎﻋﺇ  ﺔﻴﺑﺮﻌﻟﺍ ﻝﺍﻮﻣﻷﺍ ﺱﻭﺅﺭ ﺓﺩﺎﻋﺇ  ﺔﻴﺑﺮﻌﻟﺍ ﻝﺍﻮﻣﻷﺍ ﺱﻭﺅﺭ ﺓﺩﺎﻋﺇ ﺇﺇﺇﺇ ﻊﻗﺍﻮﻟﺍﻭ ﻲ￿ﺎﻣﻷﺍ ﲔﺑ ﻲﺑﺮﻌﻟﺍ ﻦﻃﻮﻟﺍ ﱃ ﻊﻗﺍﻮﻟﺍﻭ ﻲ￿ﺎﻣﻷﺍ ﲔﺑ ﻲﺑﺮﻌﻟﺍ ﻦﻃﻮﻟﺍ ﱃ ﻊﻗﺍﻮﻟﺍﻭ ﻲ￿ﺎﻣﻷﺍ ﲔﺑ ﻲﺑﺮﻌﻟﺍ ﻦﻃﻮﻟﺍ ﱃ ﻊﻗﺍﻮﻟﺍﻭ ﻲ￿ﺎﻣﻷﺍ ﲔﺑ ﻲﺑﺮﻌﻟﺍ ﻦﻃﻮﻟﺍ ﱃ  
API/WPS 0001  ﻊﻳﺩﻭ ﻥﺎ￿ﺪﻋ ﺪﻤﳏ ﻊﻳﺩﻭ ﻥﺎ￿ﺪﻋ ﺪﻤﳏ ﻊﻳﺩﻭ ﻥﺎ￿ﺪﻋ ﺪﻤﳏ ﻊﻳﺩﻭ ﻥﺎ￿ﺪﻋ ﺪﻤﳏ  ﺔﻴﺠﻴﻠﳋﺍ ﻝﻭﺪﻟﺍ ﰲ ﻝﻼﺣﻹﺍﻭ ﺔﻳﺮﺸﺒﻟﺍ ﺩﺭﺍﻮﳌﺍ ﺔﻴﻤﻨﺗ ، ﺔﻳﺮﺸﺒﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﻤﻨﺘﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﺠﻴﻠﳋﺍ ﻝﻭﺪﻟﺍ ﰲ ﻝﻼﺣﻹﺍﻭ ﺔﻳﺮﺸﺒﻟﺍ ﺩﺭﺍﻮﳌﺍ ﺔﻴﻤﻨﺗ ، ﺔﻳﺮﺸﺒﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﻤﻨﺘﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﺠﻴﻠﳋﺍ ﻝﻭﺪﻟﺍ ﰲ ﻝﻼﺣﻹﺍﻭ ﺔﻳﺮﺸﺒﻟﺍ ﺩﺭﺍﻮﳌﺍ ﺔﻴﻤﻨﺗ ، ﺔﻳﺮﺸﺒﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﻤﻨﺘﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﺠﻴﻠﳋﺍ ﻝﻭﺪﻟﺍ ﰲ ﻝﻼﺣﻹﺍﻭ ﺔﻳﺮﺸﺒﻟﺍ ﺩﺭﺍﻮﳌﺍ ﺔﻴﻤﻨﺗ ، ﺔﻳﺮﺸﺒﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﻤﻨﺘﻟﺍ 
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API/WPS 0002  ﻲ￿ﻮﺘﻟﺍ ﻲﺟﺎ￿ ﺪﻤﳏ ﻲ￿ﻮﺘﻟﺍ ﻲﺟﺎ￿ ﺪﻤﳏ ﻲ￿ﻮﺘﻟﺍ ﻲﺟﺎ￿ ﺪﻤﳏ ﻲ￿ﻮﺘﻟﺍ ﻲﺟﺎ￿ ﺪﻤﳏ   ﺖﺴﻓﻷﺍ ﺞﻣﺍﺮﺑ  ﺖﺴﻓﻷﺍ ﺞﻣﺍﺮﺑ  ﺖﺴﻓﻷﺍ ﺞﻣﺍﺮﺑ  ﺖﺴﻓﻷﺍ ﺞﻣﺍﺮﺑ  :  :  :  : ﻌﻟﺍ ﺏﺭﺎﺠﺘﻟﺍ ﺾﻌﺑ ﻌﻟﺍ ﺏﺭﺎﺠﺘﻟﺍ ﺾﻌﺑ ﻌﻟﺍ ﺏﺭﺎﺠﺘﻟﺍ ﺾﻌﺑ ﻌﻟﺍ ﺏﺭﺎﺠﺘﻟﺍ ﺾﻌﺑ ﺔﻴﺑﺮ ﺔﻴﺑﺮ ﺔﻴﺑﺮ ﺔﻴﺑﺮ  
API/WPS 0003  Riad Dahel  On the Predictability of Currency Crises: The Use of Indicators in the 
Case of Arab Countries 
API/WPS 0004 
ﺕﺎﻛﺮﺑ ﻦﻳﺮﺴ￿ ﺕﺎﻛﺮﺑ ﻦﻳﺮﺴ￿ ﺕﺎﻛﺮﺑ ﻦﻳﺮﺴ￿ ﺕﺎﻛﺮﺑ ﻦﻳﺮﺴ￿ 
ﻲـــــﻠﻌﻟﺍ ﻝﺩﺎـــﻋ ﻲـــــﻠﻌﻟﺍ ﻝﺩﺎـــﻋ ﻲـــــﻠﻌﻟﺍ ﻝﺩﺎـــﻋ ﻲـــــﻠﻌﻟﺍ ﻝﺩﺎـــﻋ 
ﺔﻴﻟﻭﺪﻟﺍ ﻕﺍﻮﺳﻷﺍ ﱃﺍ ﺫﺎﻔﻨﻟﺍ ﰲ ﺔﺤﺟﺎﻨﻟﺍ ﺏﺭﺎﺠﺘﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﻴﺴﻓﺎﻨﺘﻟﺍ ﻡﻮﻬﻔﻣ ﺔﻴﻟﻭﺪﻟﺍ ﻕﺍﻮﺳﻷﺍ ﱃﺍ ﺫﺎﻔﻨﻟﺍ ﰲ ﺔﺤﺟﺎﻨﻟﺍ ﺏﺭﺎﺠﺘﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﻴﺴﻓﺎﻨﺘﻟﺍ ﻡﻮﻬﻔﻣ ﺔﻴﻟﻭﺪﻟﺍ ﻕﺍﻮﺳﻷﺍ ﱃﺍ ﺫﺎﻔﻨﻟﺍ ﰲ ﺔﺤﺟﺎﻨﻟﺍ ﺏﺭﺎﺠﺘﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﻴﺴﻓﺎﻨﺘﻟﺍ ﻡﻮﻬﻔﻣ ﺔﻴﻟﻭﺪﻟﺍ ﻕﺍﻮﺳﻷﺍ ﱃﺍ ﺫﺎﻔﻨﻟﺍ ﰲ ﺔﺤﺟﺎﻨﻟﺍ ﺏﺭﺎﺠﺘﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﻴﺴﻓﺎﻨﺘﻟﺍ ﻡﻮﻬﻔﻣ 
API/WPS 0101  Imed Limam  MEASURING TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY OF KUWAITI BANKS  
API/WPS 0102  Ali Abdel Gadir Ali  INTERNAL SUSTAINABILITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN 
THE ARAB STATES  
API/WPS 0103  Belkacem Laabas  POVERTY DYNAMICS IN ALGERIA 
API/WPS 0104  ﻊﻳﺩﻭ ﻥﺎ￿ﺪﻋ ﺪﻤﳏ ﻊﻳﺩﻭ ﻥﺎ￿ﺪﻋ ﺪﻤﳏ ﻊﻳﺩﻭ ﻥﺎ￿ﺪﻋ ﺪﻤﳏ ﻊﻳﺩﻭ ﻥﺎ￿ﺪﻋ ﺪﻤﳏ   ﻞﻤﻌﻟﺍ ﻕﻮﺳﻭ ﻢﻴﻠﻌﺘﻟﺍ  ﻞﻤﻌﻟﺍ ﻕﻮﺳﻭ ﻢﻴﻠﻌﺘﻟﺍ  ﻞﻤﻌﻟﺍ ﻕﻮﺳﻭ ﻢﻴﻠﻌﺘﻟﺍ  ﻞﻤﻌﻟﺍ ﻕﻮﺳﻭ ﻢﻴﻠﻌﺘﻟﺍ : : : :  ﺡﻼﺻﻻﺍ ﺕﺍﺭﻭﺮﺿ   ﺡﻼﺻﻻﺍ ﺕﺍﺭﻭﺮﺿ   ﺡﻼﺻﻻﺍ ﺕﺍﺭﻭﺮﺿ   ﺡﻼﺻﻻﺍ ﺕﺍﺭﻭﺮﺿ  –ﺖﻳﻮﻜﻟﺍ ﺔﻟﺎﺣ ﺖﻳﻮﻜﻟﺍ ﺔﻟﺎﺣ ﺖﻳﻮﻜﻟﺍ ﺔﻟﺎﺣ ﺖﻳﻮﻜﻟﺍ ﺔﻟﺎﺣ 
API/WPS 0105  ﻲ￿ﻮﺘﻟﺍ ﻲﺟﺎ￿ ﺪﻤﳏ ﻲ￿ﻮﺘﻟﺍ ﻲﺟﺎ￿ ﺪﻤﳏ ﻲ￿ﻮﺘﻟﺍ ﻲﺟﺎ￿ ﺪﻤﳏ ﻲ￿ﻮﺘﻟﺍ ﻲﺟﺎ￿ ﺪﻤﳏ  ﺔﻴﺑﺮﻌﻟﺍ ﺭﺎﻄﻗﻷﺍ ﺕﺍﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﺍ ﰲ ﻲﺣﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﻉﺎﻄﻘﻟﺍ ﻕﺎﻓﺁﻭ ﺭﻭﺩ ﺔﻴﺑﺮﻌﻟﺍ ﺭﺎﻄﻗﻷﺍ ﺕﺍﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﺍ ﰲ ﻲﺣﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﻉﺎﻄﻘﻟﺍ ﻕﺎﻓﺁﻭ ﺭﻭﺩ ﺔﻴﺑﺮﻌﻟﺍ ﺭﺎﻄﻗﻷﺍ ﺕﺍﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﺍ ﰲ ﻲﺣﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﻉﺎﻄﻘﻟﺍ ﻕﺎﻓﺁﻭ ﺭﻭﺩ ﺔﻴﺑﺮﻌﻟﺍ ﺭﺎﻄﻗﻷﺍ ﺕﺍﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﺍ ﰲ ﻲﺣﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﻉﺎﻄﻘﻟﺍ ﻕﺎﻓﺁﻭ ﺭﻭﺩ 
API/WPS 0106  ﺶﻴﻨﻟﺍ ﺓﺎﳒ ﺶﻴﻨﻟﺍ ﺓﺎﳒ ﺶﻴﻨﻟﺍ ﺓﺎﳒ ﺶﻴﻨﻟﺍ ﺓﺎﳒ   ﺔﳝﺪﺘﺴﳌﺍ ﺔﻴﻤﻨﺘﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﺌﻴﺒﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﻗﺎﻄﻟﺍ  ﺔﳝﺪﺘﺴﳌﺍ ﺔﻴﻤﻨﺘﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﺌﻴﺒﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﻗﺎﻄﻟﺍ  ﺔﳝﺪﺘﺴﳌﺍ ﺔﻴﻤﻨﺘﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﺌﻴﺒﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﻗﺎﻄﻟﺍ  ﺔﳝﺪﺘﺴﳌﺍ ﺔﻴﻤﻨﺘﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﺌﻴﺒﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﻗﺎﻄﻟﺍ  :  :  :  : ﺕﺍﺪﺠﺘﺴﻣﻭ ﻕﺎﻓﺁ ﺕﺍﺪﺠﺘﺴﻣﻭ ﻕﺎﻓﺁ ﺕﺍﺪﺠﺘﺴﻣﻭ ﻕﺎﻓﺁ ﺕﺍﺪﺠﺘﺴﻣﻭ ﻕﺎﻓﺁ  
API/WPS 0107  Riad Dahel  Telecommunications Privatization in Arab Countries: An Overview  
API/WPS 0108  ﺭﺩﺎﻘﻟﺍ ﺪﺒﻋ ﻲﻠﻋ ﺭﺩﺎﻘﻟﺍ ﺪﺒﻋ ﻲﻠﻋ ﺭﺩﺎﻘﻟﺍ ﺪﺒﻋ ﻲﻠﻋ ﺭﺩﺎﻘﻟﺍ ﺪﺒﻋ ﻲﻠﻋ  ﻱﺮﺸﺒﻟﺍ ﺭﺎﻤﺜﺘﺳﻻﺍ ﺪﺋﺍﻮﻋ ﺱﺎﻴﻗﻭ ﻞﻤﻌﻟﺍ ﻕﻮﺳﻭ ﻢﻴﻠﻌﺘﻟﺍ ﲔﺑ ﺔﻗﻼﻌﻟﺍ ﺲﺳﺃ ﻱﺮﺸﺒﻟﺍ ﺭﺎﻤﺜﺘﺳﻻﺍ ﺪﺋﺍﻮﻋ ﺱﺎﻴﻗﻭ ﻞﻤﻌﻟﺍ ﻕﻮﺳﻭ ﻢﻴﻠﻌﺘﻟﺍ ﲔﺑ ﺔﻗﻼﻌﻟﺍ ﺲﺳﺃ ﻱﺮﺸﺒﻟﺍ ﺭﺎﻤﺜﺘﺳﻻﺍ ﺪﺋﺍﻮﻋ ﺱﺎﻴﻗﻭ ﻞﻤﻌﻟﺍ ﻕﻮﺳﻭ ﻢﻴﻠﻌﺘﻟﺍ ﲔﺑ ﺔﻗﻼﻌﻟﺍ ﺲﺳﺃ ﻱﺮﺸﺒﻟﺍ ﺭﺎﻤﺜﺘﺳﻻﺍ ﺪﺋﺍﻮﻋ ﺱﺎﻴﻗﻭ ﻞﻤﻌﻟﺍ ﻕﻮﺳﻭ ﻢﻴﻠﻌﺘﻟﺍ ﲔﺑ ﺔﻗﻼﻌﻟﺍ ﺲﺳﺃ 
API/WPS 0201 
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